[E-voting] PTB and Zerflow reports

John Bernard Lambe icte-jlambe at johnlambe.com
Mon Mar 22 00:36:33 GMT 2004

In the PTB report
notes 3 and 4 (sections 1.3 and 1.4) state that any "unauthorised
alterations" of the voting machine or its software by an unauthorised
person can be detected by checking the displayed version numbers.
This is nonsense, since if someone fraudulently modified it, it would
be logical for him/her not to change the version number.

Notes 9, 10 and 35 show that they decided not to regression test
certain requirements, which is hardly good practice (they *shouldn't*
have been affected by the change, but the purpose of regression testing
is to ensure that the things which shouldn't be affected aren't

Which recommendations in the Zerflow report have been implemented?

Section 1.1.1 of the Nathean Architectural Assessment & Code Review of
IES  states
  "the Department is putting in place robust installation and usage

Have any new procedures been defined (installation/usage or otherwise)?

John Lambe
Phone (mobile): +353 86 2895286
Phone:          +353 1 4905842  
Address:        64 Brighton Road, Rathgar, Dublin 6, Ireland    
Email:          jlambe at johnlambe.com

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