[E-voting] Minimum requirement to judge voting "technology"

[Marian Beddill]

At 9/6/2004  05:43 AM, David GLAUDE <dglaude at ael.be> wrote:
>Saying that it must be VVAT and respect the secrecy of the vote is one 
>thing... but is there more requirement?

............. snipped......

>Here is our first draft:
>http://wiki.ael.be/index.php/VoteElectroniqueConditions (in French)
>1. Secrecy (obvious but with eVoting, it is not easy to "randomize" 
>properly, also the voter ID must not be known by the computer)
>2. VVAT trace that can be read and counted without computer assistance.
>3. minimum % of manual recount and how to deal with discrepancy
>4. Citizen can operate without technical knowledge
>5. Paper trail of the result and sub-result (important if electronic 
>transmission of "unofficial" result is done).
>6. If the grand-total computation of the result are done electronicaly, 
>then manual recount of significant % should be done.
>
>One point is that we (PourEva) have been focusing on the end-user side of 
>e-Voting... but there are a lot of potential problem with:
>* Voter registration
>* Voter ID checking (electronic ID card)
>* Transmission of the partial-result and computation of the total result

I agree with your list, David, except perhaps on the "electronic ID card".

The respected national non-partisan organization "League of Women Voters of 
the US" passed a policy resolution at their recent convention which 
elegantly(*) states four criteria for voting systems, neatly called the 
"SARA" test (from the acronym):

"....Be it resolved that the LWVUS interpretation of the position on 
Citizens Right to Vote will now read:
"....In order to ensure integrity and voter confidence in elections, the 
LWVUS supports the implementation of voting systems and procedures that 
are:  Secure, Accurate, Recountable and Accessible....."   (SARA).

(*) simplicity may support elegance, but simplicity may also obscure 
details and lead to outcomes different from the intent of the writers of 
the language.  Thus, there continues a need for expanding on the specific 
conditions which will satisfy all of those four concepts, each embodied in 
one word -- thus elegant.

My own little website on the topic states the conditions which I have 
concluded are essential:--

"....I believe that in order to maintain trustworthy elections and "SARA" 
results, we must have no leaky buckets -- all the holes must be plugged, 
including:----

  * a voter-verified paper (physical) ballot as the legal record of each 
voters' choices ("v-vpb") -- in plain language, a separate paper ballot 
that the voter knows is correct while still at the polling-booth and 
voting, and

  * a mandatory random full-precinct recount of all ballots in about 
five-percent of the precincts in a jurisdiction, as a double-check of the 
electronic record (if computerized voting is used), and

  * a full verification of the source code written into all voting systems, 
at every point in the process - voter registration, polling-places, 
intermediate handling, voter_ID verification, vote-counting and 
vote-reporting (if computerized voting or counting is used), and

  * no live online interconnections of voting systems components, at any 
point in the process between voter and election certification, and

  * adequate attention paid to all the other elements of voting systems - 
people, hardware, staff training, education of the voters, watchfulness and 
diligence by citizens and voters. The bucket will not stay full if there 
remains even one hole that's too big!...."

Source.  See:  http://noleakybuckets.org/  for more, and supporting 
documents and working models.


Marian Beddill
"If you cannot trust the way your votes are counted, nothing much else in 
politics matters."