[E-voting] CCC to talk about use of NEDAP in Germany (2M voters)

David GLAUDE dglaude at poureva.be
Sun Dec 18 16:40:44 GMT 2005

Irish might want to know about what is taking place with NEDAP in Germany...

The thing I am talking about seems to take place in Berlin/Germany from
the 27th to the 30 December 2005.

The most interesting presentation is taking place on Day 3 by Ulrich
Wiesner... that would be on the 29th December 2005.


Was anybody in contact with Ulrich Wiesner?

The author has submitted an objection challenging the validity the 2005
elections to the Bundestag's Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections.

Ulrich Wiesner holds a PhD in Physics and is working as consultant for a
mid-size US Software Company.

Does anybody plan to go and see him at 22C3?

22nd Chaos Communication Congress
Private Investigations
	Ulrich Wiesner
Day 	3
Location 	Saal 2
Start time 	13:00
Duration 	01:00
ID 	1134
Type 	Lecture
Track 	Society
Language 	english
e-Voting: The silent decline of public control

Why German voting machines do not meet the requirements of democratic

The voting machines widely used in Germany's recent elections fail to
follow both fundamental democratic principles and German legal
requirements. Highlights of a recent Irish report on security issues of
these machines will be provided.

In this year's September elections of the Bundestag, more than 2 Million
voters had to submit their vote using voting machines of the Dutch
automation provider, Nedap. The machines, which have been subject to a
(non-public) governmental certification process, do neither allow the
voter to verify that his vote has been correctly stored, nor do they
provide a transparent and auditable vote counting process. While the a
specimen of the software has been reviewed as part of the certification
process, the software installed on the Nedap machines is at no time
subject to any authentication or validation by the German authorities.
This is of specific interest, as a recent report of an Irish government
commission claims that the implemented security measures mainly follow
the concept "security by obscurity", and that two minutes of
unauthorized access might be sufficient to replace the installed software.

    * Overview article on the voting machines used in Germany (in
German) => http://www.heise.de/ct/05/19/054/
    * Findings of the Irish Commission on Electronic Voting (in English)
    * Legal framework (in German) =>

More information about the E-voting mailing list