[E-voting] CCC to talk about use of NEDAP in Germany (2M voters)
dglaude at poureva.be
Sun Dec 25 17:16:53 GMT 2005
Are there Irish on this list that are capable of reading German writing?
Maybe Bablefish can help us.
If you have anything short and meaningfull that you want to be send in
german, I might find heise.de subscriber to post the message there.
Your concearn (not mine since Nedap is not likely to be used in Belgium)
should be to work together with German and peaple from the Netherlands
to fight Nedap.
I have put in Cc: Sjoera Nas from Bit of Freedom (and EDRi) wich might
help find opposition in the Netherland.
David GLAUDE wrote:
> Irish might want to know about what is taking place with NEDAP in Germany...
> The thing I am talking about seems to take place in Berlin/Germany from
> the 27th to the 30 December 2005.
> The most interesting presentation is taking place on Day 3 by Ulrich
> Wiesner... that would be on the 29th December 2005.
> David GLAUDE
> Was anybody in contact with Ulrich Wiesner?
> The author has submitted an objection challenging the validity the 2005
> elections to the Bundestag's Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections.
> Ulrich Wiesner holds a PhD in Physics and is working as consultant for a
> mid-size US Software Company.
> Does anybody plan to go and see him at 22C3?
> 22nd Chaos Communication Congress
> Private Investigations
> Ulrich Wiesner
> Day 3
> Location Saal 2
> Start time 13:00
> Duration 01:00
> ID 1134
> Type Lecture
> Track Society
> Language english
> e-Voting: The silent decline of public control
> Why German voting machines do not meet the requirements of democratic
> The voting machines widely used in Germany's recent elections fail to
> follow both fundamental democratic principles and German legal
> requirements. Highlights of a recent Irish report on security issues of
> these machines will be provided.
> In this year's September elections of the Bundestag, more than 2 Million
> voters had to submit their vote using voting machines of the Dutch
> automation provider, Nedap. The machines, which have been subject to a
> (non-public) governmental certification process, do neither allow the
> voter to verify that his vote has been correctly stored, nor do they
> provide a transparent and auditable vote counting process. While the a
> specimen of the software has been reviewed as part of the certification
> process, the software installed on the Nedap machines is at no time
> subject to any authentication or validation by the German authorities.
> This is of specific interest, as a recent report of an Irish government
> commission claims that the implemented security measures mainly follow
> the concept "security by obscurity", and that two minutes of
> unauthorized access might be sufficient to replace the installed software.
> * Overview article on the voting machines used in Germany (in
> German) => http://www.heise.de/ct/05/19/054/
> * Findings of the Irish Commission on Electronic Voting (in English)
> * Legal framework (in German) =>
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