[E-voting] Ohio to use paper ballots !!

Catherine Ansbro cansbro at eircom.net
Tue Jan 18 15:57:51 GMT 2005


Ciao Emanuele,

I wish I could share your optimism.  Sure I'd rather have a system that 
uses paper than one that doesn't.  Definitely.  But before you go rejoicing 
too much, you should realize that in the recent USA election there seem to 
be the most irregularities with optical scan systems.

In these systems the votes are counted on a central computer, and there 
have been various .. er. .  problems.  In fact the optically scanned votes 
have more irregularities than the horrible touchscreen systems.

It all depends on how the optical scanning device is integrated into the 
whole election system.  In particular it depends on HOW THE VOTES ARE 
COUNTED.  The vote-counting computers in the USA are showing evidence of 
having been networked, contacted by modem, etc.  It is a nightmare.  In the 
recount they didn't use a random sample but a pre-chosen and pre-counted 
sample.  Plus the person who has just made this "brilliant" decision is the 
same person who has made lots of illegal decisions--going against his own 
state laws.  He is refusing access to voting register sign-in, that are 
required by law to be made available to the public.  He is refusing to give 
sworn testimony, even though it is federal law that he do so.  He changes 
the voting rules from one day to another.  He sends voting machine 
plentifully to rich, white (Republican) polling places and sends only a few 
to heavy populated, poorer, predominantly minority, or liberal college 
campuses, (Democratic) polling places--so all the people who can't wait 4 
hours or 7 hours or 11 hours to vote have to just leave without voting.

This relates directly to Tim Murphy's earlier post expressing the belief 
that a hand recount would only needed in close races.  The Ohio 
irregularities show exactly why this is not the case.  And they show why 
you also have to be incredibly clear about what a hand recount means, how 
the areas for recount are chosen, how they are supervised, etc.  In Ohio 
there was a phrase in the state law that if a recount was being done, you 
were only to count that race and no others.  So, they sent technicians from 
the e-voting machine company around to the counting computers to "adjust" 
them before the recount, supposedly so they'd only show the results of one 
race only.  (So there goes any hope of making sure the pre-selected, 
pre-sorted ballots weren't pulled from other bundles to make the 
presidential race come out correctly.)

It is never enough to look only any one piece of technology that is chosen 
for a particular voting system (though I'd agree that some are better than 
others, and I'd consider the presence of VVAT to be a primary requirement 
in any case).  But you can't stop there.  You have to scrutinize the whole 
system and build in secure procedures and auditing mechanisms 
throughout--otherwise the whole thing is irrelevant.  This includes the 
legislation to allow for manual recounts, how those conditions are defined 
and how they might be interpreted to avoid transparency rather than 
guarantee it.

If an optical scan were used just to help the voter be sure their vote was 
validly filled out, that could have some use.  But to rely on them for 
counting. . . First check out the info about optical scan results and 
problems in the USA.

Catherine

At 16:12 18/01/2005 +0100, vote at electronic-vote.org wrote:
>Ohio's Secretary of State Ken Blackwell announced on Jan, 12th a
>directive by which all 88 Ohio counties must adopt a voting system of
>paper ballots, marked by hand and read by optical-scanning devices
>(PCOS).
>http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/1105612399208 
>372.\
>xml
>What do you think about Mr. Blackwell's directive?
>I'm so happy since it confirms all my points against e-vote I wrote in
>          http//www.electronic-vote.org
> From a "usability" point of view Paper Elections may be as good as
>electronic elections, infact, ballot papers can also be voted using
>offline devices which actually print them following the directions
>given by each elector. Such offline devices, located in the polling
>stations, can use video or audio to help electors with sigth or
>language problems. Each elector verifies that his printed ballot paper
>is what he wants and then he places it into the traditional ballot
>box.
>Obvoiusly such devices must be offline computer (not connected to any
>other computer nor network) because this is the only way we can be
>sure their results are not fraudulently remote-controlled nor monitored.
>Thus all the computer programs improving vote accessability can be
>used just the same. The only difference is that the casted votes are to be
>printed on paper instead of being transmitted to some other electronic
>equipment, but it doesn't change anything of the action of voting.
>I'm I wrong?
>Ciao from Italy,
>Emanuele Lombardi
>http://www.electronic-vote.org
>
>
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