[E-voting] terrorism and electronic elections

Brian O'Byrne bobyrne at statesoft.ie
Mon Jul 11 16:01:45 IST 2005

On Monday 11 July 2005 15:50, Pierre Muller wrote:
> Brian O'Byrne a écrit :
> > Yes, paper ballot elections are more robust. There are still
> > single points of failure and the possibility for a single event
> > to make it impossible to declare a winner. (Consider setting fire
> > to the count center after ballot boxes have been opened, for
> > example).
> You would just have to re-hold the election.
> What are the *invisible* single points of failure ?
> People are often suspicious about what happen once ballots are
> counted. Then they ask what is the use of worrying about election
> control by citizens since post-voting phase is not citizen
> controlled. It is probably robust (in our countries), but not
> transparent at all. Internet could help. Should we (we the e-voting
> activists) propose something ? Did anybody else propose anything ?


This is turning into another full discussion on the relative merits of 
different voting systems, and that is ground we have all covered in 
some detail.

I don't think it will be useful to go over it all again.

To answer your specific questions: There are no invisible failure 
modes in the paper ballot system that I am aware of, unless you count 
scenarios where a conspiracy of key people hatch a plan that would 
put Ocean's Eleven to shame.

Various things are being proposed and discussed with members of the 
Government. Reference for example the recent thread on meetings 
between Margaret McGaley and others of ICTE and members of the PDs.

Brian O'Byrne, Statesoft Ltd.
Tel: +353 1 4100 993, +353 86 240 4719

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