[E-voting] Re: terrorism and electronic elections

paul.holden at icsmember.ie paul.holden at icsmember.ie
Tue Jul 12 13:01:19 IST 2005

For me, questions remain: If we end up with VVAT, and we decide to check by
sampling, what happens if the sample audit uncovers a discrepancy between the
paper and the electronic votes? Is the paper taken as the true vote in that
constituency only, or is the entire electronic election declared invalid in
favour of the paper? And if a margin of error is allowed, how big is that
margin? What triggers a full manual count in all constituencies?

 Quoting e-voting-request at lists.stdlib.net:

> Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2005 10:02:10 +0100
> From: Michael McMahon <michael at hexmedia.com>
> Sampling of the actual votes, rather than of voters
> statements about how they did or will vote, is governed
> by normal rules of mathematical probability.
> I do share your concern that the checking might eventually
> be dispensed with, but that's why the laws regulating e-voting
> need to be primarily concerned with the details of auditing
> and checking, and not with how the system itself is constructed.
> At least if auditing is mandated by law, then there is a reasonable
> chance that losing candidates will create a fuss, if the procedures
> are not completely followed.
> Personally, I believe it would be quite easy technically to add
> a printer to the voting machines, and while I do have some
> reservations about VVAT, I think it could be a viable solutio.

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