[E-voting] e Challenge 2005 (conference 19 - 21 October 2005,
david.ocallaghan at cs.tcd.ie
Mon Jun 20 17:20:48 IST 2005
On 20/06/05 16:35, Michael McMahon wrote:
> There is a presentation about it here.
Thanks for the link! The presenter appears to have the same slightly
cyncial viewpoint as the speaker at the talk I attended: many of the
security concerns are brushed off with an attitude of "the public don't
care about security/privacy as long as the system is convenient for
them". At the risk of over-generalising, this may be a symptom of recent
emergence from totalitarian rule where anything seems better than what
has gone before.
> The pres includes a high-level risk analysis, which acknowledges various
> things like the possibility for fraud. An interesting point
> they make is that you would have to trust the "central system" which
> I presume aggregates the votes. They say this is equivalent to
> trusting the "Election Committee" for existing paper based elections,
> and therefore that's ok.
> But I wonder if the underlying assumption is really true.
> If existing paper ballot election counts are
> conducted in public, then I don't see how it could be true.
Yes, that aspect looks quite odd to me. For one thing, the
authentication step itself is concealed from the voter: a voter
presumably gets a yes -or-no answer as to whether their vote has been
accepted. If they're rejected they won't know the reason. From the ID
card talk, it seemed quite possible to report your enemy's ID card as
stolen to have it temporarily disabled!
The more serious aspect is the anonymisation and counting stage. It's
hard to see how a single piece of opaque software is comparable to an
election committee. Compromising the software might require only one or
two individuals whereas comprimising the traditional counting process
(at least in the Irish case) would require a conspiracy involving many
of the returning officers, counting staff, etc.
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