[Fwd: Re: [E-voting] About Estonian e-voting]

Colm MacCarthaigh colm at stdlib.net
Mon Oct 24 12:15:59 IST 2005

On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 09:10:35PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
> Agree.  We have to trust someone somewhere.  Even in a paper election no 
> one observer can be everywhere at once.  

A lot of those observers are in competition, and very keen to see that
the other side does not cheat. Cheating is vastly more manifest and
detectable on paper.

>  We have to trust other people didn't see something bad.   For the
>  software,  the best way to do this is to give out the source codes
>  (signed by us) to several groups for inspection.  If no people
>  complain, one group compiles the code on a known clean compiler and
>  they and others then sign the compiled object.  I concede that,
>  unlike making ballot box seals, someone who wants to watch software
>  signing will actually see very little but we should rely on several
>  groups' satisfaction with the code.

This is a pointless waste of time. The malicious code could be in 
the compiler, or in a library used, even the basic system libraries.
It could be in the kernel, and it could even be in the hardware. You
need to read;


for just one example of how this works.

Colm MacCárthaigh                        Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net

More information about the E-voting mailing list