[E-voting] The best VVAT is good for

Marian Beddill beddill at nas.com
Mon Oct 24 16:39:52 IST 2005


At 10/24/2005  08:24 AM, you wrote:

>On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 04:21:07PM +0100, Catherine Ansbro wrote:
> > VVAT only has value as a partial mitigation against the completely
> > unacceptable option of a paper-less and unauditable DRE.  I.e., it is
> > somewhat better than the worst-case situation.
> >
> > But it is not a "solution" to aspire to, for the reasons I mentioned
> > previously.  And it is dangerous in itself in that it can mislead people
> > into thinking it is more of a solution than it is.
>
>I think this confuses the issue. A Voter Verified Audit Trail is simply
>a mechanism by which the voter has verified

No.   That's why I came to use the term "verifiable" -- opportunity -- not 
past tense.
A V-V-able-P-A-T  still has the hand-count at the election central, as the 
method of deterral and checking.  The multi-partisan teams of counters can 
only check the TOTALS - the paper actually seen first-hand by the voter 
(thus verifiable) is taken to be valid, without further action by the 
individual voter.

Marian Beddill
Washington State

>the correct recording of
>their vote :-)
>
>For example; the current, completely un-electronic voting system
>posesses a VVAT in the form of our ordinary ballot papers, That's all a
>VVAT is.
>
>--
>Colm MacCárthaigh                        Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net



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