[Fwd: Re: [E-voting] About Estonian e-voting]
colm at stdlib.net
Tue Oct 25 09:26:47 IST 2005
On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 02:39:42PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
> I see no reason why a DRE system can't let a voter set a receipt with a
> password they make up. It works for Internet voting. Part of the
> receipt is encrypted with the vote. After close of polls when votes are
> decrypted, the partial receipts are provided as evidence that the votes
> were decrypted.
Frankly, if you can't see for yourself the several huge gaping flaws in
that line of reasoning, please go away and stop wasting our time.
1. It would have to be possible to tie a voter to their vote
in order for them to verify it in such a manner. This would
would permit voter intimidation, vote buying, and so on.
2. Zero reasons exist why the "decrypted" vote, shown to anyone
who wishes to inspect it, need equal the votes as counted.
You'd have to decrypt them all, verify them all, and count
them all by some other means.
Please go away and stop wasting our time.
Colm MacCárthaigh Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net
More information about the E-voting