[Fwd: Re: [E-voting] About Estonian e-voting]

Colm MacCarthaigh colm at stdlib.net
Tue Oct 25 09:26:47 IST 2005


On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 02:39:42PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
> I see no reason why a DRE system can't let a voter set a receipt with a 
> password they make up.  It works for Internet voting.  Part of the 
> receipt is encrypted with the vote.  After close of polls when votes are 
> decrypted, the partial receipts are provided as evidence that the votes 
> were decrypted.  

Frankly, if you can't see for yourself the several huge gaping flaws in
that line of reasoning, please go away and stop wasting our time.

	1. It would have to be possible to tie a voter to their vote
	   in order for them to verify it in such a manner. This would
	   would permit voter intimidation, vote buying, and so on.

	2. Zero reasons exist why the "decrypted" vote, shown to anyone
	   who wishes to inspect it, need equal the votes as counted.
	   You'd have to decrypt them all, verify them all, and count
	   them all by some other means.

Please go away and stop wasting our time.

-- 
Colm MacCárthaigh                        Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net



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