[Fwd: Re: [E-voting] About Estonian e-voting]
caburt at alphalink.com.au
Tue Oct 25 11:27:49 IST 2005
Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:
>On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 02:39:42PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
>>I see no reason why a DRE system can't let a voter set a receipt with a
>>password they make up. It works for Internet voting. Part of the
>>receipt is encrypted with the vote. After close of polls when votes are
>>decrypted, the partial receipts are provided as evidence that the votes
>Frankly, if you can't see for yourself the several huge gaping flaws in
>that line of reasoning, please go away and stop wasting our time.
> 1. It would have to be possible to tie a voter to their vote
> in order for them to verify it in such a manner. This would
> would permit voter intimidation, vote buying, and so on.
This only provides better carriage of the votes, it doesn't prove they
were ultimately counted or included. It doesn't allow a voter to prove
how they voted in an unsupervised manner. Some basic information
security is missing from DREs, I'm not arguing for them.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the E-voting