[Fwd: Re: [E-voting] About Estonian e-voting]

Craig Burton caburt at alphalink.com.au
Tue Oct 25 11:27:49 IST 2005



Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:

>On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 02:39:42PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
>  
>
>>I see no reason why a DRE system can't let a voter set a receipt with a 
>>password they make up.  It works for Internet voting.  Part of the 
>>receipt is encrypted with the vote.  After close of polls when votes are 
>>decrypted, the partial receipts are provided as evidence that the votes 
>>were decrypted.  
>>    
>>
>
>Frankly, if you can't see for yourself the several huge gaping flaws in
>that line of reasoning, please go away and stop wasting our time.
>
>	1. It would have to be possible to tie a voter to their vote
>	   in order for them to verify it in such a manner. This would
>	   would permit voter intimidation, vote buying, and so on.
>  
>
This only provides better carriage of the votes, it doesn't prove they 
were ultimately counted or included.  It doesn't allow a voter to prove 
how they voted in an unsupervised manner.  Some basic information 
security is missing from DREs, I'm not arguing for them.


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