[E-voting] The best VVAT is good for
caburt at alphalink.com.au
Wed Oct 26 08:56:16 IST 2005
Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:
>On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 08:36:19PM +1000, Craig Burton wrote:
>>I'd love to lean about it. Can you provide some references?
162 submissions - I'll have to read them another time
"The present paper ballot system incorporates a voter verified audit
trail. The ballot paper issued
to each voter is in the exclusive and uninterrupted control of the voter
from the time it is franked
to the time it is dropped into the ballot box, and it is subsequently
secured by well-established
procedural controls. The voter is justifiably certain that the ballot
paper contains only the marks
he/she has made on it. Although the ballot paper is principally used for
the initial counting, it
is also the final authoritative record of the voter's preferences."
The majority of people can't know their votes made it. A representative
sample probably can't know their votes made it.
An individual would have to pursue the ballot box all the way to the
counting room, stand close to a counter, then be sure the counter read
your vote options correctly for each redistribution. Or be happy with
the ERO's decision on your ambiguous markings.
It doesn't scale, it's not a practical VVAT solution which is available
to any and all.
The vast majority have to trust others.
I can't see how this majority trust is definitely acceptable above and
yet relying on (several independent) technical people to make
professional assessments of systems and code is definitely not acceptable.
It boils down to technology + trust : seals "so far as we know, been
alleged or suggested that anything untoward has happened to a ballot box
at any election over the past 80 years."
I see no description of a VVAT system in this doc.
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