Re: [E-voting] Paper trail wanted for vote
beddill at nas.com
Mon Apr 17 01:34:49 IST 2006
Oakley wrote about a VVPB: "... If voters said the printout was different
from what they entered, chaos could ensue...."
Well, maybe, if the review of "the printout" from a voting machine was
AFTER voting! That's why I and others have always insisted that the VVPB
("voter-verifiable paper ballot") must be viewable WHILE the voter is still
in the process, and thus, if there is any difference between her INTENT and
the paper, she can CANCEL before finishing, and return to the process of
voting, until it is right.
The only complication, then, is that when (not "IF") the voter-verifiable
paper ballots are used for a hand-count, only the final one for each voter
is counted -- the rejected "erroneous" incomplete copies must be
ignored. It will take some administrative stuff and elections staff training.
At 4/16/2006 04:15 PM, you wrote:
>Paper trail wanted for vote
>The Sunday Times - Ireland
>The government will face increased pressure to fit printers to its
>electronic voting machines when a commission set up to investigate the
>system publishes its findings.
>The independent Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV) is expected to
>highlight the use of printers as a means of increasing public trust in
>electronic voting, when it reports in a few months. The 51m system is in
>storage pending the outcome of tests.
>A number of American states considering buying the same system are
>demanding they be able to produce a record of votes. A verifiable paper
>trail is also considered best practice by the European commission.
>Because the CEV was asked to report on the accuracy of the system in its
>current form, the issue of printers is technically outside its scope.
>However, it will be raised in its next report.
>Nedap Powervote, the Dutch firm that supplied the Irish machines, is
>marketing its ballot modules in America in conjunction with a local
>operator, Liberty Election Systems.
>The Dutch company has consistently argued that its machines do not need
>printers to ensure reliability. But it will introduce them in America
>because they are required by law in some states.
>In Ireland, a paper record would assure voters that their ballots were
>correctly recorded by the machine and should increase confidence in the system.
>The Department of the Environment has argued against a paper trail,
>pointing out that machines are used elsewhere in Europe without them and
>that it could complicate matters. If voters said the printout was
>different from what they entered, chaos could ensue.
>Irelands electronic voting system was piloted in three constituencies in
>the general election of 2002. It was suspended after the CEV said it was
>not in a position to recommend its use as it had not had sufficient time
>to test it fully.
>The government is currently spending 700,000 a year storing the machines.
>E-voting mailing list
>E-voting at lists.stdlib.net
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