[E-voting] 'Paper trail' wanted for vote

Michael McMahon michael at hexmedia.com
Mon Apr 17 10:36:43 IST 2006

Marian Beddill wrote:
> Oakley wrote about a VVPB:   "... If voters said the printout was 
> different from what they entered, chaos could ensue...."
> Well, maybe, if the review of "the printout" from a voting machine was 
> AFTER voting!  That's why I and others have always insisted that the 
> VVPB ("voter-verifiable paper ballot") must be viewable WHILE the 
> voter is still in the process, and thus, if there is any difference 
> between her INTENT and the paper, she can CANCEL before finishing, and 
> return to the process of voting, until it is right. 
> The only complication, then, is that when (not "IF") the 
> voter-verifiable paper ballots are used for a hand-count, only the 
> final one for each voter is counted -- the rejected "erroneous" 
> incomplete copies must be ignored.  It will take some administrative 
> stuff and elections staff training.
The issue here is that voters could (possibly mischievously) claim that the
printout is different from what they have entered on the machine. For 
you could claim "I keep voting for X, but the machine keeps printing Y".
The problem is that the poll workers are not allowed to look at the machine
or the printout to verify what the voter is saying, and then chaos could 

My view on that is that voters should have the option to cancel the vote 
on the machine
and fill out a paper ballot instead. In our system, these votes would 
have to be entered
into another machine at the count centre. This wouldn't be a problem 
because it would
be anonymous and would be done in front of several witnesses who would 
all check
that the VVAT printout *is correct*.


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