[E-voting] [a.oostveen@rathenau.nl: BREAKING NEWS]

Craig Burton caburt at alphalink.com.au
Mon Nov 6 09:28:19 GMT 2006

In all cases, it is good that WeHateVotingComputers also cite 
solutions.  They say Tempest observation can be made a lot harder by the 
display rendering a persistent character or cursor to the right of the 
display.  If you cite solutions then there really is very little the 
providers can say along the lines of  "defending against Tempest is out 
of scope".  It also sets a path for mediation.  In the Dutch case, 
Ministry of the Interior will force a mod to the machines as a precedent 
(albeit a theoretical one) is there.
The same was true for Dutch Ministry of Interior specifications for 
remote Internet voting (called, KOA, put to RFT in 2004) which required 
a program-proved solution.  This is the first case of program-proving I 
have seen in e-voting software.
It also needs to be a requirement for e-voting machines as PVVAT will 
always be hard to justify for parallel count in more than a few % of 
poll stations.

David GLAUDE wrote:
> Please, if you going for the dutch hacking path to show that those
> equipment are not TEMPEST proof, get a sample NEDAP voting computer
> while they are spread around the country and don't wait for them to be
> all stored centrally in Army premises. ;-)
> By the way, wich Department do you trust more, Environment or Defense?
> David GLAUDE
> PourEVA member were very afraid of the tactics use by the Dutch.
> Apparently it does work and attract media attention... but they do not
> stress on the fundamental problem (and solution) and only on a problem
> that the government and/or NEDAP can claim to have fixed.
> We still do not believe that was the right way... and I still don't get
> it why is it the SDU device that are removed while they have the same
> problem (but worst) as the NEDAP device...
> You (Irish) seems to have succeed by stressing on a solution (VVAT) and
> explaining how it solve THE problem.
> We (Belgian) only started to have real media attention when we started
> to stress on the price (some in your country did too) and this was only
> because the money was to be taken from somebody else's pocket (region
> government rather than central government).
> Well, we had media attention each time some of us refused to vote (but
> came to the voting station) because voting is mandatory in Belgium.
> I still don't understand the dynamics and differences that make the
> fight for accountable democracy work differently in different country...
> I think that if we understand that, we will be able to help other
> "emerging/sinking" country.
> Justin Mason wrote:
>> By the way, from what I know about TEMPEST and EMI, it sounds like it
>> might be possible to guess where TEMPEST problems are likely to crop up,
>> based on the location of unshielded cables and the data that travels on
>> those cables.  For example, in the Dutch case, it's the wires leading from
>> the main board to the display LCD that emits the signals that can be
>> snooped, iirc.  But I guess actively attacking the Irish system a la the
>> Dutch researchers would be quite a big project, overall, really ;)
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