[E-voting] encryption compromised by hardware
Patrick J Kobly
patrick at kobly.com
Mon Nov 20 18:12:58 GMT 2006
Michael McMahon wrote:
> Patrick J Kobly wrote:
>> This is the huge assumption made by most cryptographers developing
>> crypto-protocols for reliable e-voting. The assumption is that the
>> system the user interacts with acts as a faithful agent of the user
>> with respect to encrypting, recording and displaying vote data.
>> Thompson talks about why this assumption cannot be made (and in
>> general any proof is illusory).
> Well, that is not true with respect to the crypto based systems which
> I have looked at.
> For example, David Chaum's system based on visual encryption
Chaum's system falls under the exception that I identified earlier in
the post - namely voter-verifiable audit mechanisms. In this case,
there is a physical artifact of the vote that is verifiable by the voter
without the use of intermediary tools.
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