[E-voting] encryption compromised by hardware

Michael McMahon michael at hexmedia.com
Mon Nov 20 18:35:39 GMT 2006

Patrick J Kobly wrote:
> Michael McMahon wrote:
>> Patrick J Kobly wrote:
>>> This is the huge assumption made by most cryptographers developing 
>>> crypto-protocols for reliable e-voting.  The assumption is that the 
>>> system the user interacts with acts as a faithful agent of the user 
>>> with respect to encrypting, recording and displaying vote data.  
>>> Thompson talks about why this assumption cannot be made (and in 
>>> general any proof is illusory).
>> Well, that is not true with respect to the  crypto based systems 
>> which I have looked at.
>> For example, David Chaum's system based on visual encryption
>> (http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/voting/papers/Chaum-SecretBallotReceiptsTrueVoterVerifiableElections.pdf) 
> Chaum's system falls under the exception that I identified earlier in 
> the post - namely voter-verifiable audit mechanisms.  In this case, 
> there is a physical artifact of the vote that is verifiable by the 
> voter without the use of intermediary tools.
> PK
Ok, point taken, but it's worth noting that many are sceptical about 
technological solutions to the problem.
Look at the comment on bbvforums quoted at the beginning of this thread.

I think it is only fair to make the distinction between systems like 
Chaum's which have some rational
claim to security, and the snake-oil that others are pushing.


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