[E-voting] encryption compromised by hardware
michael at hexmedia.com
Mon Nov 20 18:35:39 GMT 2006
Patrick J Kobly wrote:
> Michael McMahon wrote:
>> Patrick J Kobly wrote:
>>> This is the huge assumption made by most cryptographers developing
>>> crypto-protocols for reliable e-voting. The assumption is that the
>>> system the user interacts with acts as a faithful agent of the user
>>> with respect to encrypting, recording and displaying vote data.
>>> Thompson talks about why this assumption cannot be made (and in
>>> general any proof is illusory).
>> Well, that is not true with respect to the crypto based systems
>> which I have looked at.
>> For example, David Chaum's system based on visual encryption
> Chaum's system falls under the exception that I identified earlier in
> the post - namely voter-verifiable audit mechanisms. In this case,
> there is a physical artifact of the vote that is verifiable by the
> voter without the use of intermediary tools.
Ok, point taken, but it's worth noting that many are sceptical about
technological solutions to the problem.
Look at the comment on bbvforums quoted at the beginning of this thread.
I think it is only fair to make the distinction between systems like
Chaum's which have some rational
claim to security, and the snake-oil that others are pushing.
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