[E-voting] Draft 1 and new date
colm at stdlib.net
Wed Oct 4 19:08:48 IST 2006
I phone Sean Whelan, RTE's European Affairs editor, who seems pretty
interested, he might be able to make the dutch press conference tomorrow
(in the Hague).
Anyway, in consultation with our Dutch friends, it's probably best if
we wait until tomorrow for a press release, as that's when they will
be releasing even more information.
First draft follows, comments, changes ,etc, welceom. Need more quotes,
NEDAP VOTING MACHINES HACKED
The recently formed Dutch anti e-voting group, "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers
niet (We don't trust voting computers", has revealed on national dutch
television program "EenVandaag" on Nederland 1, that they have successfully
produced a modified version of the software which runs on the voting machine
itself that is capable of mis-recording votes intentionally. These machines
are in all important respects identical to the machines purchased for use in
The group have produced a modified version of the software which runs on the
voting machine itself that is capable of mis-recording votes intentionally.
ICTE representative Colm MacCarthaigh, who has seen and examined the
compromised Nedap machine in action in Amsterdam notes "The attack presented by
the Dutch group would not need significant modification to run on the Irish
systems. The machines use the same construction and components, and differ
only in relatively minor aspects such as the presence of extra LEDs to assist
voters with the Irish voting system. The machines are so similar that the Dutch
group has been using only the technical reference manuals and materials
relevant to the Irish machines as a guide, as those are the only materials
Maurice Wessling, of Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet, adds "Compromising the
system requires replacing only a single component, roughly the size of a stamp,
and is impossible to detect just by looking at the machine".
Both ICTE and Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet view this as yet another
demonstration that no voting system which lacks a voter-verified audit trail.
According to ICTE spokesperson Margaret McGaley "Any system which lacks a means
for the voter to verify that their vote has been correctly records is
fundamentally and irreperably flawed".
The Irish Government remain uncommitted to this principle and have, so far, not
accepted that the conclusions of the Commission on Electronic Voting's report
call for major overhauls to the Nedap systems and the inclusion of a Voter
Verified Audit Trail. "INSERT OTHER GOOD QUOTE HERE ABOUT HOW THE GOV SEEM
TO BE LVING IN A PARALELL UNIVERSE".
Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet
email: mmcgaley at cs.may.ie
phone: 087 755 4023
email: joe.mccarthy at arkaon.com
phone: 086 245 6788
Colm MacCárthaigh (In Amsterdam):
email: colm at stdlib.net
phone: +31 6 54242980
Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE) is a group of ordinary citizens
who believe that no electronic voting system can be trustworthy unless it
includes a voter-verified audit trail.
ICTE has a website available at
ICTE's main goals are:
* to ensure that any electronic voting system introduced in Ireland
meets the following criteria
o it includes a Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT),
o a booth is used, analogous to the traditional polling booth,
o all development uses formal methods,
o all source code is open to public scrutiny and audit.
* to prevent the use of the Nedap/Powervote system in Irish Elections
until it meets said criteria
* to prevent the purchase of any more equipment or software from
Nedap/Powervote by the Irish Government unless the system being
purchased meets said criteria.
Colm MacCárthaigh Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net
More information about the E-voting