[E-voting] Current draft

Keith Martin keith at keith.gs
Wed Oct 4 23:42:09 IST 2006


I would suggest an opening paragraph before that.  It starts kind of
suddenly.

Keith


---Begin forwarded message---
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2006 22:03:23 +0100
From: Colm MacCarthaigh <colm at stdlib.net>
Subject: [E-voting] Current draft
To: e-voting at lists.stdlib.net

o.k., current draft attached, for sending around 10AM (Irish time)
tomorrow morning;

NEDAP VOTING MACHINES HACKED

[DRAFT]

A Dutch group have produced a modified version of the software which runs on
the voting machine itself that is capable of mis-recording votes
intentionally.
   
The recently formed Dutch anti e-voting group, "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers
niet" (We don't trust voting computers), has revealed on national Dutch
television program "EenVandaag" on Nederland 1, that they have successfully
hacked the Nedap machines -- identical to the machines purchased for use in
Ireland in all important respects.

ICTE representative Colm MacCarthaigh, who has seen and examined the
compromised Nedap machine in action in Amsterdam, notes "The attack
presented
by the Dutch group would not need significant modification to run on the
Irish
systems.  The machines use the same construction and components, and differ
only in relatively minor aspects such as the presence of extra LEDs to
assist
voters with the Irish voting system. The machines are so similar that the
Dutch
group has been using only the technical reference manuals and materials
relevant to the Irish machines as a guide, as those are the only materials
publicly available."

Maurice Wessling, of Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet, adds "Compromising
the
system requires replacing only a single component, roughly the size of a
stamp,
and is impossible to detect just by looking at the machine".

Both ICTE and Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet view this as yet another
demonstration that no voting system which lacks a voter-verified audit trail
can be trusted. According to ICTE spokesperson Margaret McGaley "Any system
which lacks a means for the voter to verify that their vote has been
correctly
recorded is fundamentally and irreparably flawed".

Margaret McGaley highlighted that it is the machines themselves that are
at risk. "This particular issue is not about the vote counting software,
which we already know must be replaced, this is about the machines that
the Taoiseach has claimed were 'validated beyond any question'. We now
have proof that these machines can be made to lie about the votes that
have been cast on them. It is abundantly clear that these machines would
pose a genuine risk to our democracy if used in elections in Ireland." 

[END]

Links;

	Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet
	http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/

	ICTE;
	http://evoting.cs.may.ie/

Contacts;

Margaret McGaley:

	email: mmcgaley at cs.may.ie
	phone: 087 755 4023

Joe McCarthy:

	email:	joe.mccarthy at arkaon.com
	phone:	086 245 6788

Colm MacCarthaigh (In Amsterdam):

	email: colm at stdlib.net
	phone: +31 6 54242980

[ABOUT ICTE]

Irish Citizens for Trustworthy E-voting is an independent group of over
one hundred concerned citizens, IT & Security Practitioners, and Legal
Professionals calling for the introduction of a Voter Verified Audit
Trail with any E-voting system used in Ireland.

ICTE has a website available at

http://evoting.cs.may.ie/

ICTE's main goals are:

    * to ensure that any electronic voting system introduced in Ireland
      meets the following criteria

        o it includes a Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT),
	
        o a booth is used, analogous to the traditional polling booth,

        o all development uses formal methods,

        o all source code is open to public scrutiny and audit.

    * to prevent the use of the Nedap/Powervote system in Irish Elections 
      until it meets said criteria

    * to prevent the purchase of any more equipment or software from
      Nedap/Powervote by the Irish Government unless the system being
      purchased meets said criteria.

-- 
Colm MacCarthaigh                        Public Key: colm+pgp at stdlib.net






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