[E-voting] reply to Thomas Greene

Fergal Daly fergal at esatclear.ie
Wed Oct 25 13:08:26 IST 2006

Spleen vented...

You link to 2 of your previous articles on this subject but you do not
link to the 3rd article in that series in which you published my


I believe this letter comprehensively refutes your entire argument
(then and now) and even if you disagree, I think we can agree that
this letter represents the views of a large number of "activists". If
you are going to label myself, my colleagues, many brilliant computer
scientists, the Irish Computer Society and the ACM as obsessed, then
the least you could do is include their side of the story by providing
the full context, not just the pieces you support,


On 25/10/06, Fergal Daly <fergal at esatclear.ie> wrote:
> This is so annoying. I sent a detailed response last time which they
> published in full
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/11/evoting_paper_trail/
> (which of course, he does not link to in his "previous coverage" section)
> As far as I can see, he makes no new points in this article.
> He is an A1 fuck-wit and I regret giving him the page-impressions it
> took for me to find the new and old articles,
> F
> On 25/10/06, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at cs.nuim.ie> wrote:
> > Michael McMahon wrote:
> > > I sent them a response as well.
> > >
> >
> > Me too :)
> >
> > ---
> >
> > Dear Mr Greene,
> >
> > I was disappointed by your article "Irish e-voting emerges from the
> > crypt" in the Register today. For one thing, you seem to misunderstand
> > what we "activists" want when we call for a paper record. As far as I am
> > aware, everyone who is calling for mandatory paper records intends that
> > they be _the_ official record of votes cast. Any discrepancy between
> > electronic and paper ballots is easily resolved - paper takes precedence.
> >
> > You also agree with an Taoiseach's statement that "the anti-electronic
> > voting campaign group in the Netherlands physically hacked into a
> > machine to demonstrate security flaws. If one hacked into a ballot box
> > one could do that too". Please explain to me how a ballot box can be
> > undetectably altered so that a ballot cast into it would be changed by
> > the time it hit the bottom of the box.
> >
> > I agree that no voting system can be better than the security
> > arrangments that are integral to it. A badly designed e-voting system
> > which incorporated paper ballots could be worse than anything we've seen
> > yet. However, the best security arrangments in the world will not make
> > paperless e-voting safe. As with any other computer system you could
> > name, you can only consider it safe and reliable if you can audit it
> > (independently of the system's own claims about itself), and currently
> > the only way you can audit a secret-ballot election is with paper
> > ballots verified by individual voters.
> >
> > Margaret McGaley
> >
> > ---
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > E-voting mailing list
> > E-voting at lists.stdlib.net
> > http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
> > http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
> >

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