[E-voting] Open source voting system

Fergal Daly fergald at gmail.com
Tue Apr 9 01:12:12 IST 2013


On 9 April 2013 05:28, Patrick Kobly <patrick at kobly.com> wrote:

> -----Original message-----
> From:   michael at hexmedia.com
> Sent:   Mon 08-04-2013 13:04
> Subject:        Re: [E-voting] Open source voting system
> To:     Catherine Ansbro <cansbro at eircom.net>;
> CC:     e-voting at lists.stdlib.net; freeandfair at lists.timui.org;
> > On 2013-04-08 17:38, Catherine Ansbro wrote:
> > > 4) It is not enough that an independent voter can verify their own
> > > vote. All kinds of shenanigans may have been done, with some of the
> > > other votes that I cannot verify--e.g., adding in extra votes in the
> > > name of voters who are known not to have voted at recent elections.
> > >
> >
> > True, but no system can completely overcome that problem. There's
> > nothing to stop
> > administrators stuffing paper ballots belonging to voters who didn't
> > turn up.
>
> FWIW, in the paper election process used in Canada:
>
> - printed ballot blanks issued to elections officials are counted prior to
> the opening of the polls
> - ballot boxes are demonstrated to be empty and are sealed immediately
> prior to the opening of the polls
> - ballot boxes are kept in plain sight while the polls are open
> - the process whereby electors are authenticated is open and observable
> - electors who have voted are marked in a poll-book as having voted
> - the ballot issued to an elector has a detachable counterfoil which is
> serial numbered and whose serial number can be observed without observing
> the markings on the folded ballot
> - when the ballot is returned to be deposited in the box (and immediately
> before it is placed in the box), it is confirmed that the serial matches
> the ballot that was issued and the counterfoil is removed
> - at the close of polls, the ballot box is opened and counted in precinct
> - number of ballot blanks issued must balance against ballots in the box +
> remaining unused ballots + spoiled ballots returned.  Ballots in the box
> must balance against electors marked in the poll-book as having voted.
>

When you say "must", what do you mean. What happens if they don't?

I'm not trying to poke holes in this method, it's very close to what
happens in Ireland, I'm just curious,

F


> - ballots and paperwork are sealed in envelopes countersigned by
> observers, which are in turn sealed in ballot boxes, countersigned by
> observers
>
> All of these steps are conducted in view of:
> - at least two nominally impartial elections officials
> - representatives of the candidates in the race(s) being contested
> (having, as a result, diametrically opposed interests with respect to the
> outcome of the election)
>
>
> PK
> >
> > If anyone is interested, I'll post a copy of the paper I wrote
> > somewhere
> > (if I can find it).
> >
> > Michael.
> >
> >
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> > http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
> >
>
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