[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

Margaret McGaley mmcgaley at gmail.com
Mon Jan 2 09:44:34 GMT 2017

I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.
Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?
And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
start with the state where those researchers live and work. I'd also
take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.


On 2 January 2017 at 04:25,  <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:
> Interesting link.
> Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern. Inaccuracies are repeated to the point of being disinformation. The statistical audit methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.
> Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations published prior to the election?
> Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail to note the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known can be used to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties, and states--with pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts, or certain demographics in a certain address range)?  This now-proven vulnerability has been used,  apparently for years. It was initially applied as an unauthorized "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.
> The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig votes in ways that will not raise red flags has been proven. This method means the risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely ineffective--the speakers said their proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would be applied to an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig individual machines. This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method is dangerous as it would be yet another confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust results that may have been rigged.
> See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information there. THEN watch the Fraction Magic video.
> THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at blackboxvoting.org
> The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.
> Catherine
> ----- Original Message -----))
>> From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
>> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
>> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
>> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
>> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
>> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
>> this talk:
>> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election
>> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
>>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
>>> current status of:
>>> Belgium
>>> Germany
>>> The Netherlands
>>> Estonia
>>> Switzerland
>>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
>>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?
>>> Thanks,
>>> Margaret
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