[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
cansbro at eircom.net
cansbro at eircom.net
Mon Jan 2 13:23:22 GMT 2017
There is NO state I'm aware of that is friendly to meaningful recounts or actual look-at-all-the-ballots recounts. The obstacles that arise are unbelievable--and that's before you factor in apparently corrupt judicial decisions.
The DREs with toilet-paper roll "paper trail" are known to be useless for audit or recount purposes and have never been used for that purpose. It's only a confidence fairy gimmick.
And the things that COULD be used--like the ballot images every optical scanner in the USA is capable of producing, a capability only discovered shortly before the election--are apparently not being checked anywhere. In some states where people went to court to ensure ballot images were kept (which involved making sure election officials tick a drop-down box on their central tabulator), a judge ruled this posed an unacceptable administrative burden and it could cause disruption. Hmmm. And those ballot image files are tiny--here was no question about memory issues.
What's more, even the DREs were found to produce and store an internal "ballot image equivalent" that could be of value as a record of original voter input--not as good as a paper record or true ballot image, but potentially still valuable. Are they being looked at anywhere? Not that I'm aware of. As mentioned, it is nearly impossible to do a true recount or audit because of legal or financial or administrative obstacles. Time is a big obstacle--deadlines for certifying results mean there's no time to jump over the multiple hurdles.
Plus, even when fraud is ultimately proven it is too late and there are no remedies and no accountability. See Richard Hayes Phillips' book or YouTube talks about his meticulous audit of the 2004 presidential election in Ohio. It took him till 2008 to complete. It proved the Ohio election was stolen, and the heft of Ohio determined the national result. No media would touch it, if course--another topic in itself.
In Ireland we are lucky in so many election matters--and yet there is no voice questioning why we are required to mark ballots IN PENCIL--this should be a huge red flag--and why ballots are transported by GARDAI w/o multiple observers being required. Combine those two things and our Irish system is just as easy to rig by insiders as any terrible system in the USA! I hear no voices objecting to this vulnerability and I'd love ideas about what could be done. We've seen enough Gardai-related issues that we should be demanding this massive chain-of-custody loophole in our Irish elections be closed, and ink should be used to mark ballots and not pencil.
----- Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.
> Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?
> And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
> start with the state where those researchers live and work. I'd also
> take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
> or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.
> On 2 January 2017 at 04:25, <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:
> > Interesting link.
> > Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern. Inaccuracies are repeated to the point of being disinformation. The statistical audit methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.
> > Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations published prior to the election?
> > Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail to note the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known can be used to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties, and states--with pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts, or certain demographics in a certain address range)? This now-proven vulnerability has been used, apparently for years. It was initially applied as an unauthorized "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.
> > The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig votes in ways that will not raise red flags has been proven. This method means the risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely ineffective--the speakers said their proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would be applied to an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig individual machines. This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method is dangerous as it would be yet another confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust results that may have been rigged.
> > See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information there. THEN watch the Fraction Magic video.
> > THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at blackboxvoting.org
> > The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.
> > Catherine
> > ----- Original Message -----))
> >> From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> >> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> >> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
> >> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
> >> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
> >> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
> >> this talk:
> >> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election
> >> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> Hi all,
> >>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
> >>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
> >>> current status of:
> >>> Belgium
> >>> Germany
> >>> The Netherlands
> >>> Estonia
> >>> Switzerland
> >>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
> >>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?
> >>> Thanks,
> >>> Margaret
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