[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

Kommer Kleijn vooreva at kommer.be
Mon Jan 2 16:41:42 GMT 2017


Yes I agree. Although their partial and incomplete results failed to 
provide proof of tamper, it did not exclude it at all. But they did 
admit so themselves. The report that reveals that recounts are almost 
impossible in a certain state is quite worrisome. In addition I was 
puzzled by their response to an audience question that recommended to 
examine DRE machines after the election. The presenters confirmed 
such audits would be useful without warning that well made attacks on 
DRE's may be conceived in a way to erase themselves and all traces of 
the manipulation from memory before quitting, and leave a totally 
'clean' machine and memory card behind after the facts. If you find 
proof of tamper then you have proven tamper, but if you do not find a 
trace then that does not actually prove that there was none! 
Therefore I feel such audits may (again) provide false re-assurance 
and that therefore their usefulness is debatable. A second reason why 
they are debatable is that they can not be executed by 'normal' (read 
non-IT) people, and therefore would probably be delegated to private 
companies again as soon as executed in any significant number.

Lastly the presenters put DRE+VVAT at the same level as scanned 
ballots while we know that a significant number of DRE voters do not 
actually read the printed trail before pressing the confirmation 
button, and that therefore scanned paper ballots are clearly superior 
to DRE+(VV)AT.

Best regards,

Kommer, Belgium.

  On 10:44 02/01/2017, Margaret McGaley wrote:
>I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.
>Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?
>And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
>start with the state where those researchers live and work. I'd also
>take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
>or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.
>On 2 January 2017 at 04:25,  <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:
> > Interesting link.
> >
> > Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern. 
> Inaccuracies are repeated to the point of being disinformation. The 
> statistical audit methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.
> >
> > Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical 
> revelations published prior to the election?
> >
> > Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but 
> fail to note the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it 
> is now known can be used to produce specific results in multiple 
> precincts, counties, and states--with pinpoint precision (e.g. 
> targeting only certain precincts, or certain demographics in a 
> certain address range)?  This now-proven vulnerability has been 
> used,  apparently for years. It was initially applied as an 
> unauthorized "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.
> >
> > The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party 
> contractors they mentioned, who administer elections) to have 
> complete control to rig votes in ways that will not raise red flags 
> has been proven. This method means the risk-reduction approach to 
> auditing is completely ineffective--the speakers said their 
> proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would be applied 
> to an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig 
> individual machines. This assumption is wrong and the proposed 
> audit method is dangerous as it would be yet another 
> confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust results that 
> may have been rigged.
> >
> > See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the 
> information there. THEN watch the Fraction Magic video.
> >
> > THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters 
> at blackboxvoting.org
> >
> > The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.
> >
> > Catherine
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----))
> >> From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> >> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" 
> <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> >> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
> >> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
> >
> >> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
> >> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
> >> this talk:
> >>
> >> 
> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election
> >>
> >> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley 
> <mmcgaley at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> Hi all,
> >>>
> >>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
> >>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
> >>> current status of:
> >>>
> >>> Belgium
> >>> Germany
> >>> The Netherlands
> >>> Estonia
> >>> Switzerland
> >>>
> >>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
> >>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?
> >>>
> >>> Thanks,
> >>> Margaret
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >> E-voting at lists.stdlib.net
> >> http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
> >> http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
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