[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

Joseph Kiniry kiniry at gmail.com
Mon Jan 2 19:41:39 GMT 2017

Hi all,

On Mon, Jan 2, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.

We are only partially reassured.  The point is we need to better understand
exactly how reassured we should (or should not) be given the evidence
provided in the partial recounts.  And how big of a grain of salt is
necessary with each piece of evidence that the state provides?  Etc.

> Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?

It is not all DRE without VVAT.  Much of it is.  See below for the reason
to pay attention to PA.  Also, our goal was forensic audits of voting
equipment in PA as well as showing that the current electoral system in PA
is perhaps the worst in the whole of the USA.

> And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
> start with the state where those researchers live and work.

MI was not chosen because it is where the Univ. of MI is located.

MI, WI, and PA were chosen because they are the three states with the
smallest margin won by Trump, and thus if there were evidence of
malfeasance in any of them, then the entire election would be called into
question and we would have to pursue audits/recounts in other states
beyond.  In particular, states won by HRC by a small margin were next on
the list.  We had extensive discussions about NV, FL, NH, and more.

> I'd also
> take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
> or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.

Adversarial thinking along those lines was a large part of our analysis.
Please remember that understanding elections law (which is a synthesis of
federal, state, and local law) is quite complex in America.  In fact, we
have found just in this smallest case study that election laws wrt audits
are not even internally consistent (see PA).  Moreover, the means by which
SOSs and EOs conduct recounts is not always aligned with the intent of the
law (see MI and PA).


> Margaret
> On 2 January 2017 at 04:25,  <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:
> > Interesting link.
> >
> > Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern.
> Inaccuracies are repeated to the point of being disinformation. The
> statistical audit methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.
> >
> > Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations
> published prior to the election?
> >
> > Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail
> to note the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known
> can be used to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties,
> and states--with pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts,
> or certain demographics in a certain address range)?  This now-proven
> vulnerability has been used,  apparently for years. It was initially
> applied as an unauthorized "patch" to some central tabulators starting in
> 2001.
> >
> > The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they
> mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig votes
> in ways that will not raise red flags has been proven. This method means
> the risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely ineffective--the
> speakers said their proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would
> be applied to an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig
> individual machines. This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method
> is dangerous as it would be yet another confidence=promoting gesture,
> encouraging us to trust results that may have been rigged.
> >
> > See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information
> there. THEN watch the Fraction Magic video.
> >
> > THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at
> blackboxvoting.org
> >
> > The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.
> >
> > Catherine
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----))
> >> From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> >> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net
> >
> >> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
> >> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
> >
> >> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
> >> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
> >> this talk:
> >>
> >> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_
> uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election
> >>
> >> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>> Hi all,
> >>>
> >>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
> >>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
> >>> current status of:
> >>>
> >>> Belgium
> >>> Germany
> >>> The Netherlands
> >>> Estonia
> >>> Switzerland
> >>>
> >>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
> >>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?
> >>>
> >>> Thanks,
> >>> Margaret
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> E-voting mailing list
> >> E-voting at lists.stdlib.net
> >> http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
> >> http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
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