[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

Joseph Kiniry kiniry at gmail.com
Mon Jan 2 19:45:02 GMT 2017


Hi,

On Mon, Jan 2, 2017 at 7:25 AM, <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:

> Thinking about the role of judges (and State Attorneys General who are
> often the decision-makers in USA election rulings)--this is a little
> understood area. It's also relevant for Ireland. I will explain.
>
> In Memphis TN where a number of blatant election anomalies were discovered
> (which led to the Fraction Magic discoveries, reports and video)--when the
> databases of actual elections going back 10 years was discovered (databases
> that BlackBoxVoting.org had obtained through discovery in a prior court
> case), the ONLY RACES that were found to have been tampered--obvious
> because of the rounding errors uncovered--were those of JUDGES and PUBLIC
> PROSECUTOR.
>
> Any election challenge or subsequent criminal charges would be prosecuted
> (or rather, NOT prosecuted) by the same judges who had been elected via
> election-rigging.
>
> Can you start to see why it's so hard to get meaningful improvements to
> election administration in the USA? Is it possible that other countries
> also have compromised judges?
>

Are you contending that a not insignificant fraction of judges and public
prosecutors in the USA have knowingly manipulated our electoral system
through collusion with sophisticated hackers or the vendors themselves via
the misuse of a single vendor's old EMS feature in order to prevent
election integrity into the future?

This is, IMO, sounds more like a made for TV movie than reality.

Joe


>
> Catherine
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> > To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> > Sent: Monday, 2 January, 2017 04:44:34
> > Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
>
> > I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.
> > Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?
> > And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
> > start with the state where those researchers live and work. I'd also
> > take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
> > or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.
> >
> > Margaret
> >
> > On 2 January 2017 at 04:25,  <cansbro at eircom.net> wrote:
> >> Interesting link.
> >>
> >> Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern.
> Inaccuracies are
> >> repeated to the point of being disinformation. The statistical audit
> >> methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.
> >>
> >> Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations
> published
> >> prior to the election?
> >>
> >> Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail
> to note
> >> the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known can
> be used
> >> to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties, and
> states--with
> >> pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts, or certain
> >> demographics in a certain address range)?  This now-proven
> vulnerability has
> >> been used,  apparently for years. It was initially applied as an
> unauthorized
> >> "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.
> >>
> >> The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they
> >> mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig
> votes in
> >> ways that will not raise red flags has been proven. This method means
> the
> >> risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely ineffective--the
> speakers
> >> said their proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would be
> applied to
> >> an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig individual
> machines.
> >> This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method is dangerous as
> it would
> >> be yet another confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust
> results
> >> that may have been rigged.
> >>
> >> See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information
> there. THEN
> >> watch the Fraction Magic video.
> >>
> >> THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at
> >> blackboxvoting.org
> >>
> >> The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.
> >>
> >> Catherine
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----))
> >>> From: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> >>> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" <
> e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> >>> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
> >>> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe
> >>
> >>> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
> >>> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
> >>> this talk:
> >>>
> >>> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_
> uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election
> >>>
> >>> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley <mmcgaley at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>> Hi all,
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
> >>>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
> >>>> current status of:
> >>>>
> >>>> Belgium
> >>>> Germany
> >>>> The Netherlands
> >>>> Estonia
> >>>> Switzerland
> >>>>
> >>>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
> >>>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?
> >>>>
> >>>> Thanks,
> >>>> Margaret
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> E-voting mailing list
> >>> E-voting at lists.stdlib.net
> >>> http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
> >>> http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > http://evoting.cs.may.ie/
>
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