[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

cansbro at eircom.net cansbro at eircom.net
Mon Jan 2 20:23:44 GMT 2017


Re: Corrupt judges 

This appears to be the case in at least some places. I've no idea how widespread. 
The Memphis TN results (elections with signs of tampering being exclusively races for judiciary & prosecutor) took the investigators by surprise. (Source for my info about Memphis TN--personal conversation with Bev Harris. She has mentioned it in a couple interviews but not in the formal Fraction Magic reports or video. I suggest you confirm this directly with her or Bennie Smith.) 

Before the 2016 election, there were some astonishing judicial decisions that ensured post-election audits could not occur. For example, the judge who decided that asking election officials to choose to make and retail ballot images--just ticking a dropdown box--was too burdensome to require. Even though that feature had been touted for its ability to ensure election integrity. 

Kenneth Blackwell's rulings on the 2004 election in OH are another example. 

There were other cases where one judge would be replaced with another at the last minute, who would then declare that there was no need to scrutinize the election despite clear evidence (this happened at Memphis). 

Previously & independently--nothing to do with elections, FBI & CIA whistleblowers talked about having to do background checks on people being considered for being promoted for public office, judges & elected officials. After doing extensive background checks (financial indiscretions, sexual indiscretions, any vulnerability)--they discovered that those with the worst backgrounds were the ones recommended. The squeaky clean people weren't recommended at all. 

Subsequently & independently--nothing to do with elections--I learned that all high court judges in Ireland have huge debts (as in many million € or tens of million € in unrepayable, defaulted loans). In Ireland you're not allowed to be a high court judge if you are bankrupt. However, interestingly, not a single bank has put pressure on the high court judges. In Ireland, prosecutions of massive banking and gov't and regulatory fraud has been notably absent. The book which revealed these details--naming names, etc.--was not reviewed in the press and got no media attention. ("Waiting for the Sheriff") 

These are just a few examples. Over the years I've seen so many heartbreaking judicial decisions that blocked election integrity actions. 

Take these together and I no longer assume the judiciary are independent. I'm not saying all judges are corrupt. I'm saying there is more corruption and unstated blackmail than we dream of. And I'm saying it is an important obstacle in relation to election integrity. (Consider that choosing locations to employ certain kinds of election rigging may well depend on where one can count on friendly judges/prosecutors/attorneys general.) 

Catherine 

> From: "Joseph Kiniry" <kiniry at gmail.com>
> To: "cansbro" <cansbro at eircom.net>
> Cc: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>, "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy
> Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> Sent: Monday, 2 January, 2017 14:45:02
> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

> Hi,

> On Mon, Jan 2, 2017 at 7:25 AM, < cansbro at eircom.net > wrote:

>> Thinking about the role of judges (and State Attorneys General who are often the
>> decision-makers in USA election rulings)--this is a little understood area.
>> It's also relevant for Ireland. I will explain.

>> In Memphis TN where a number of blatant election anomalies were discovered
>> (which led to the Fraction Magic discoveries, reports and video)--when the
>> databases of actual elections going back 10 years was discovered (databases
>> that BlackBoxVoting.org had obtained through discovery in a prior court case),
>> the ONLY RACES that were found to have been tampered--obvious because of the
>> rounding errors uncovered--were those of JUDGES and PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.

>> Any election challenge or subsequent criminal charges would be prosecuted (or
>> rather, NOT prosecuted) by the same judges who had been elected via
>> election-rigging.

>> Can you start to see why it's so hard to get meaningful improvements to election
>> administration in the USA? Is it possible that other countries also have
>> compromised judges?

> Are you contending that a not insignificant fraction of judges and public
> prosecutors in the USA have knowingly manipulated our electoral system through
> collusion with sophisticated hackers or the vendors themselves via the misuse
> of a single vendor's old EMS feature in order to prevent election integrity
> into the future?

> This is, IMO, sounds more like a made for TV movie than reality.

> Joe

>> Catherine

>> ----- Original Message -----
>> > From: "Margaret McGaley" < mmcgaley at gmail.com >
>> > To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" < e-voting at lists.stdlib.net >
>> > Sent: Monday, 2 January, 2017 04:44:34
>> > Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

>> > I'm also fascinated that they were reassured by their failed recounts.
>> > Why did they bother with Pennsylvania if it's all DRE without VVAT?
>> > And their home-state? I know if I was mounting an attack I wouldn't
>> > start with the state where those researchers live and work. I'd also
>> > take into account the laws in my target states. States where it's hard
>> > or impossible to call for a recount would be at the top of my list.

>> > Margaret

>> > On 2 January 2017 at 04:25, < cansbro at eircom.net > wrote:
>> >> Interesting link.

>> >> Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern. Inaccuracies are
>> >> repeated to the point of being disinformation. The statistical audit
>> >> methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.

>> >> Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations published
>> >> prior to the election?

>> >> Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail to note
>> >> the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known can be used
>> >> to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties, and states--with
>> >> pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts, or certain
>> >> demographics in a certain address range)? This now-proven vulnerability has
>> >> been used, apparently for years. It was initially applied as an unauthorized
>> >> "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.

>> >> The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they
>> >> mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig votes in
>> >> ways that will not raise red flags has been proven. This method means the
>> >> risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely ineffective--the speakers
>> >> said their proposed audit approach assumes that any rigging would be applied to
>> >> an entire county or state, as it would be too hard to rig individual machines.
>> >> This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method is dangerous as it would
>> >> be yet another confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust results
>> >> that may have been rigged.

>> >> See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information there. THEN
>> >> watch the Fraction Magic video.

>> >> THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at
>> >> blackboxvoting.org

>> >> The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.

>> >> Catherine

>> >> ----- Original Message -----))
>> >>> From: "Margaret McGaley" < mmcgaley at gmail.com >
>> >>> To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" < e-voting at lists.stdlib.net >
>> >>> Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
>> >>> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

>> >>> Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
>> >>> I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
>> >>> this talk:

>> >>> https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election

>> >>> On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley < mmcgaley at gmail.com > wrote:
>> >>>> Hi all,

>> >>>> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
>> >>>> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
>> >>>> current status of:

>> >>>> Belgium
>> >>>> Germany
>> >>>> The Netherlands
>> >>>> Estonia
>> >>>> Switzerland

>> >>>> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
>> >>>> the latest on these (or any other) countries?

>> >>>> Thanks,
>> >>>> Margaret

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