[E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

cansbro at eircom.net cansbro at eircom.net
Mon Jan 2 20:37:06 GMT 2017

Joseph, the dialogue is appreciated. 

Agree a separate thread would be good re: Fraction Magic and its use in prior election rigging. 
The blanket discounting of this is one of the things that most concerned me, as the ability to target specific areas makes the proposed Risk Reduction Auditing method an ineffective solution. 

Note also Richard Hayes Phillips' detailed report on the democratic primary elections provided copious amounts of prima facie evidence of election rigging. (Note Phillips doesn't make accusations, but indicates drily where investigations and audits are needed.) His report was devastating--and deeply disturbing at how demographics were apparently being used as a way of rigging elections in a non-uniform way (particularly regarding race in southern-state elections) in a way that would elude the kind a one-size risk-reduction "audit". 


> From: "Joseph Kiniry" <kiniry at gmail.com>
> To: "cansbro" <cansbro at eircom.net>
> Cc: "Margaret McGaley" <mmcgaley at gmail.com>, "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy
> Evoting" <e-voting at lists.stdlib.net>
> Sent: Monday, 2 January, 2017 14:34:15
> Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

> Hello all,
> I'm happy to answer questions v-v the Presidential Election and our analyses,
> work on recounts, etc.

> I was on the team with Alex and Matt. There are another 20+ of us working on
> these matters.

> Be assured, we know very well the various matters that have been brought up in
> this recent thread. Just because something was not discussed in the CCC talk
> doesn't mean we didn't spend a significant amount of time on it.

> We are now working on a few papers that will be submitted for peer-review. Our
> primary goal now is to take what we have learned and work with authorities to
> improve election law, policy, and operations for future elections in America.

> Now, to address Catherine's particular points below...

> On Sun, Jan 1, 2017 at 8:25 PM, < cansbro at eircom.net > wrote:

>> Interesting link.

>> Much that's excellent, and much that gives me serious concern. Inaccuracies are
>> repeated to the point of being disinformation. The statistical audit
>> methodology recommended is based on false assumptions.

> I'd love to hear the reasoning behind this statement.

>> Why are these excellent researchers unaware of technical revelations published
>> prior to the election?

> Do you mean exclusively those you mention below, or something else?

>> Why do these researchers mention election management systems, but fail to note
>> the critical flaws in the central tabulators, which it is now known can be used
>> to produce specific results in multiple precincts, counties, and states--with
>> pinpoint precision (e.g. targeting only certain precincts, or certain
>> demographics in a certain address range)? This now-proven vulnerability has
>> been used, apparently for years. It was initially applied as an unauthorized
>> "patch" to some central tabulators starting in 2001.

> We are well aware of security problems and operational challenges with
> tabulators, both central and precinct, mark sense and optical.

> But given the context of this election, the only thing that we could do/were
> permitted to do was hundreds of hours of analysis on reported elections results
> down to the ward level (the finest granularity reported in the USA). We used a
> whole suite of standard electoral fraud analyses, working directly with the
> best folks in the world who do this kind of thing regularly for decades.

>> The ability of election insiders (such as the 3rd-party contractors they
>> mentioned, who administer elections) to have complete control to rig votes in
>> ways that will not raise red flags has been proven.
> We agree that such insider threats are a serious cause of concern.

>> This method means the risk-reduction approach to auditing is completely
>> ineffective--the speakers said their proposed audit approach assumes that any
>> rigging would be applied to an entire county or state, as it would be too hard
>> to rig individual machines.
> The auditing approach that the elections integrity is recommending is Risk
> Limiting Audits, which can work quite well in both a peanut butter spread
> approach (as summarized in the talk, I believe), as well as in a staged,
> geographically segmented approach (which is more complex, but can then better
> mitigate the risks that you are focusing upon). I suggest reading Philip
> Stark's many papers on this topic so that you can better understand the
> strengths and limitations of RLAs.

>> This assumption is wrong and the proposed audit method is dangerous as it would
>> be yet another confidence=promoting gesture, encouraging us to trust results
>> that may have been rigged.

> This is a wholly inaccurate statement. Please read some of Philip's papers
> first, then we can talk about the utility of RLAs. I can provide a prioritize
> list of papers, if you like, and even share a bibliography which contains all
> of them of interest.

>> See the "Fraction Magic" 6 short reports and digest the information there. THEN
>> watch the Fraction Magic video.

>> THEN read the articles on Audits and Recounts and related matters at
>> blackboxvoting.org

>> The situation is once again revealed to be far worse than we imagined.

> I'm afraid that most of us are unconvinced of the Bev's recently claims wrt
> these features in elections systems' use in subverting elections. We can talk
> about that in another thread if you like.

> Best,
> Joe

>> Catherine

>> ----- Original Message -----))
>> > From: "Margaret McGaley" < mmcgaley at gmail.com >
>> > To: "Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting" < e-voting at lists.stdlib.net >
>> > Sent: Sunday, 1 January, 2017 16:24:20
>> > Subject: Re: [E-voting] Current state of evoting in Europe

>> > Thanks so much for all the replies. I'll give you updates on the thing
>> > I'm writing soon I hope. In the meantime you might be interested in
>> > this talk:

>> > https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8074-recount_2016_an_uninvited_security_audit_of_the_u_s_presidential_election

>> > On 16 December 2016 at 17:48, Margaret McGaley < mmcgaley at gmail.com > wrote:
>> >> Hi all,

>> >> I'm writing a thing, and I'm finding it hard to get up-to-date
>> >> information on e-voting in Europe. I'm particularly interested in the
>> >> current status of:

>> >> Belgium
>> >> Germany
>> >> The Netherlands
>> >> Estonia
>> >> Switzerland

>> >> Does anyone still subscribe to this list? And if so, does anyone know
>> >> the latest on these (or any other) countries?

>> >> Thanks,
>> >> Margaret

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>> > http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
>> > http://evoting.cs.may.ie/

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